Chapter 19: Workmen\u27s Compensation by Shaughnessy, Maurice F.
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law
Volume 1960 Article 22
1-1-1960
Chapter 19: Workmen's Compensation
Maurice F. Shaughnessy
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml
Part of the Workers' Compensation Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Shaughnessy, Maurice F. (1960) "Chapter 19: Workmen's Compensation," Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law: Vol. 1960, Article 22.
CHAPTER 19 
Workmen's Compensation 
MAURICE F. SHAUGHNESSY 
§19.1. General. During the 1960 SURVEY year several unusual 
cases in the field of workmen's compensation were presented to the 
Supreme Judicial Court. In this field of social legislation administered 
by a quasi-judicial board, the Court for the most part reiterated prin-
ciples determined in many previous decisions, to wit: the court must 
sustain the findings of the reviewing board unless they are wholly lack-
ing in evidential support or are tainted by error of law;l when medical 
evidence is conflicting it presents a question of fact to be determined by 
the board;2 the board is free to accept such portions of testimony as 
they believe credible;3 whether the employee's death was caused by 
gradual deterioration or was accelerated by working conditions is a 
question of fact;4 the decision rendered by the board must include 
specific and definite findings upon the evidence reported that will 
enable the court to determine if correct rules of law have been applied;1I 
a decision upon the question of causation is one of fact that is within 
the province of the board to determine and unless lacking in eviden-
tial support cannot be disturbed by the court;6 when a pre-existing 
heart disease of an employee is accelerated by the employment, there 
may be found to be an injury arising out of and in the course of the 
employment.7 
§19.2. Injuries to which act applies. In Messersmith's Case,1 the 
employee, while on a trip for his employer, collapsed and died while 
playing golf. A claim was made by his widow for workmen's compen-
sation benefits for herself and a minor child. The single member 
awarded compensation, and his findings and decision were adopted by 
the reviewing board. In the Superior Court a final decree was entered 
that the deceased did not receive an injury arising out of and in 
MAURICE F. SHAUGHNESSY is a partner in the firm of Parker, Coulter, Daley and 
White, Boston. 
§19.1. 1 Hartman's Case, 336 Mass. 508, 5II, 146 N.E.2d 509, 5II (1957). 
2 Murphy's Case, 328 Mass. 301, 304, 103 N.E.2d 267, 269 (1952). 
3 Luczek's Case, 335 Mass. 675, 677-678,141 N.E.2d 526, 528 (1957). 
4 Brzozowski's Case, 328 Mass. 113, 116, 102 N.E.2d 399,400 (1951). 
II Judkin's Case, 315 Mass. 226, 227, 52 N.E.2d 579, 580 (1943). 
6 Mahoney's Case, 337 Mass. 629, 632, 150 N.E.2d 729, 731 (1958). 
7 McMurray's Case, 331 Mass. 29, 32-33,116 N.E.2d 847, 849-850 (1954). 
§19.2. 1340 Mass. II7, 163 N.E.2d 22 (1959). 
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the course of his employment, and that his death was not causally 
related to any injury and dismissed the widow's claim. The widow 
appealed. The death certificate stated the cause of death as "probable 
coronary thrombosis." Messersmith worked for the company as an 
engineer and "key salesman." He traveled a great deal in business 
even though he had known arteriosclerotic heart condition. While 
in South Carolina, accompanied by the majority stockholder of the 
company by which he was employed, they were invited to play golf 
with two customers. Because of inclement weather conditions the 
match was not played, but in the afternoon they did play golf with a 
third person. While playing golf Messersmith had a heart attack and 
died. 
The Supreme Judicial Court remanded the case to the reviewing 
board for proper subsidiary findings. The question whether injuries 
sustained in the course of recreational activities connected in some way 
with the employment are within the scope of the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act has before Moore's Case2 never been raised in this Com-
monwealth, except perhaps in McManus' Case.3 McManus, a caddy 
employed by a golf club, was struck while standing on the tee by a 
golf club swung by another caddy who was about to play. The ac-
cident occurred at a time when the caddies were allowed to use the 
course. The board found, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, 
that the injury did not arise out of and in the course of the employ-
ment. In Moore's Case, the Court was presented an opportunity to 
re-examine the position previously taken in McManus on recreational 
activities. Not every injury suffered by one who is in the employ of 
another falls within the purview of the act. It is limited to injuries 
arising out of and in the course of the employment.4 This require-
ment imposes a burden upon the employee of showing that his injury 
and his employment are causally related. As was said in Caswell's 
Case, "[i]f it [the injury] arises out of the nature, conditions, obliga-
tions or incidents of the employment; in other words, out of the em-
ployment looked at in any of its aspects," 5 the statutory requirement 
is satisfied. Whether Messersmith, by playing golf on Sunday with his 
employer's majority stockholder, was occupying himself consistently 
with his contract of hire was a factual question for the board to de-
termine. The decision of the single member and the reviewing board 
was in part based upon a subsidiary finding that was unsubstantiated by 
the evidence; therefore, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the de-
cree entered by the lower court and recommitted the matter for further 
findings by the board. 
A study of the Massachusetts cases indicates that not everything that 
may be considered an incident of the employment is necessarily com-
pensable. Some of those cases that have been held to be compensable 
2330 Mass. I, llO N.E.2d 764 (1953). 
3289 Mass. 65,193 N.E. 732 (1935). 
4 G.L., c. 152, §6. 
5305 Mass. 500, 502, 26 N.E.2d 328, 330 (1940). 
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shed light on the nature of the incidents: the employee injured while 
walking down a stairway on his way to lunch;6 a compositor killed in a 
fall from the roof of the employer's building after seeking fresh air 
on a hot night;7 a bridge welder killed in a fall from a bridge while 
answering a call of nature;8 death resulting from a fall while arising 
from lunch on the employer's premises;D a fall on a stairway at the 
close of the noon hour.l0 Similarly, the following are illustrative of 
cases in which recovery has been denied: a road laborer killed when he 
fell from a steam roller owned by another contractor while discussing 
personal business with another employee;l1 an employee sitting with 
a girl on his knee during lunch hour on the employer's premises and 
injured by a machine when he arose to return to work;12 a dishwasher 
injured when he fell in the locker room where he had gone to get a 
newspaper. IS 
An analysis of the decisions in the Moore14 and Messersmith 1fl cases 
indicates a disposition on the part of the Supreme Judicial Court to 
look more favorably upon the claims arising out of injuries occurring 
during recreational activities. 
The heart cases, so called, are composing a larger and larger per· 
centage each year of the total cases presented to the Industrial Ac-
cident Board. Nearly all physicians are in agreement that arterio-
sclerosis is not caused by the ordinary industrial employment. In 
nearly every heart case decided by the Supreme Judicial Court the 
medical experts assumed that arteriosclerosis was present. The issue 
in these heart cases is whether trauma, either emotional or physical, 
is sufficient to cause damage to the heart. Although the board for 
over a quarter of a century has been awarding or denying compensation 
in this type of case, the medical profession is divided as to whether 
any physical trauma, other than a penetrating wound, actually causes 
cardiovascular damage. Since there is nothing more firmly established 
in our compensation law than the ruling that on questions of fact 
there is no appeal from a finding of the board, the Court continues to 
reaffirm this basic principle. In recent years the Court has, on numer· 
ous occasions, adhered to the basic principle that there is no appeal 
from a finding of fact by the board, but has tended to look more 
closely at the subsidiary findings upon which the board predicates its 
finding of fact. In Messersmith,16 the Court remanded the case to the 
6 Sundine's Case, 218 Mass. I, 105 N.E. 4l1l1 (1914). 
7 Von Ette's Case, 2211 Mass. 56,111 N.E. 696 (1916). 
8 Haskins' Case, 261 Mass.4l16, 158 N.E. 845 (1927). 
D Holmes' Case, 267 Mass. lI07, 166 N.E. 827 (1929). 
10 Nagle's Case,lIOll Mass. lI84, 22 N.E.2d 475 (19l19). 
11 O'Toole's Case, 229 Mass. 165,118 N.E.lIOll (1918). 
12 Rochford's Case, 2114 Mass. 9l1, 124 N .E. 891 (1919). 
18 Horton's Case, 275 Mass. 572, 176 N.E. 648 (19l1l). 
14l1l10 Mass. I, 110 N.E.2d 764 (195l1). 
151140 Mass. 117, 1611 N.E.2d 22 (1959). 
16 Ibid. 
3
Shaughnessy: Chapter 19: Workmen's Compensation
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1960
§19.3 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 211 
reviewing board for proper subsidiary findings; in Ackroyd's Case,17 
also decided during the 1960 SURVEY year, the Court remanded the 
case to the board to enlarge the record; in Crawford's Case,18 again 
decided this year, the Court remanded for proper subsidiary findings. 
It is of interest to note that during the 1960 SURVEY year every heart 
case in which an award was made to the employee was either reversed 
or remanded by the Supreme Judicial Court. 
§19.3. Incapacity. It is well established that the Supreme Judicial 
Court must sustain the findings of the board of review unless they 
are lacking in evidential support.1 In Hachadourian's Case,2 the Court 
reversed the findings of the board as it was of the opinion that there 
was no evidential support because the medical expert for the employee 
found only a possibility of causal relationship. 
The employee was injured on April 10, 1952, when struck on the 
shoulder by a bundle of heavy wire. On April 16, 1954, he filed a 
claim for compensation alleging partial disability from that date. The 
single member rendered a decision in favor of the employee, and the 
reviewing board affirmed and adopted the findings and decision of the 
single member except as to the duration of the employee's incapacity. 
There was a dispute between the medical experts whether the in-
jury of April 10, 1952, was causally related to the partial disability of 
the employee, which first manifested itself immediately after April 
12, 1954. The Court indicated that the testimony of the medical ex-
pert for the employee indicated only a possibility of the existence of 
a causal connection between the injury and the claimant's disability, 
and on this ground it reversed the decision of the Industrial Accident 
Board. 
The Court is to be congratulated for its decision in Hachadourian, 
for it indicates that in the so-called heart cases, the medical evidence 
upon which findings are predicated will be closely scrutinized in the 
future. 
This question of causal relationship is a matter beyond the com-
mon knowledge of the ordinary layman, and it has consistently been 
held that proof of it must rest upon expert medical testimony. The 
Court will not attempt to determine whether the opinion of a physi-
cian is medically sound.s A decision upon the question of causation 
is one of fact that rests entirely upon medical knowledge and is for the 
board to determine, and, unless lacking in evidential support, will not 
be disturbed.4 The Court will sustain the general findings of the board 
if possible.5 In Fennell's Case,6 the Court first laid down the rule that 
17340 Mass. 214, 163 N.E.2d 271 (1960). 
18340 Mass. 719,166 N.E.2d 724 (1960). 
§19.3. 1 Karelis' Case, 328 Mass. 224,102 N.E.2d 773 (1952). 
2340 Mass. 81, 162 N.E.2d 663 (1959), also noted in §12.5 supra. 
3 Murphy's Case, 328 Mass. 301, 304, 103 N .E.2d 267, 269 (1952). 
4l\1ahoney's Case, 337 Mass. 629, 632,150 N.E.2d 729,731 (1958). 
5 Sawyer's Case, 315 Mass. 75, 79,51 N .E.2d 949,951 (1943). 
6289 Mass. 89, 193 N .E. 885 (1935). 
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if an employee is able to do some type of work and is unable to obtain 
the type of work he is able to do, a finding of incapacity would be 
warranted. The Massachusetts Workm.en's Compensation Act is in 
many respects much broader in scope than compensation acts of many 
other states. Chapter 152 uses the word "incapacity" for work rather 
than "disability." The word "incapacity" has been judicially inter-
preted far more broadly than the word "disability." 
It is well established in the body of the Workmen's Compensation 
Act that the findings of the board of review must be sustained unless 
tainted by error of law;7 it is equally well founded that the opinion 
of a medical expert, however phrased, that amounts to no more than 
an expression indicating the possibility or chance of the existence of 
a causal connection between the accident and the disability is not 
enough to establish the accident as a cause and the disability as the 
effect.8 The Court will not attempt to determine whether the opinion 
of a doctor is medically sound.9 But if the only evidence to support 
the claim of the employee is that of a medical expert whose testimony 
is equivocal, contradictory, and confusing, the finding of the board 
will be reversed. 
During the past several years there has been a substantial increase 
in the number of claims for "cardiac injuries." This trend will un-
doubtedly continue because of the number of older workers covered 
by the more liberal definition of compensable heart injuries. The 
basic philosophy of the Workmen's Compensation Act is that the cost 
of injuries sustained in the course of employment is in actuality an 
expense of production and, therefore, should be borne by industry 
and not by the employee nor by welfare agencies. This proposition 
has never seriously been questioned in recent years. The vexing 
problem facing the board in cardiac injuries, however, is in determin-
ing the pathophysiological sequence of events. There is frequently a 
strong difference in expert medical opinion as to the actual presence 
or absence of a cardiac injury, the exact time of onset, the length of 
disability, and in cardiovascular injuries resulting in death it is not 
unusual to have different diagnoses by opposing medical experts. It 
is generally conceded by physicians specializing in the field of cardi-
ology that stimuli of occupational origin will in certain instances 
cause, hasten, or precipitate cardiac lesions. Apart from industrial 
origin there are many other factors that may cause the same type of 
cardiac injury, such as heredity, diet, body structure, tobacco, choles-
terol and metabolic disorders, although, at present, there is not suffi~ 
cient medical research to determine what role these play in an indi-
vidual patient. The task of ascertaining the cause and effect relation-
ship between an industrial stimulus and a cardiac disorder or lesion 
is generally a factual question for the board's determination. Ordi-
7 Hartman's Case, 336 Mass. 508, 511,146 N.E.2d 509, 511 (1957). 
8 Josi's Case, 324 Mass. 415,418,86 N.E.2d 641, 643 (1949). 
9 Murphy's Case, 328 Mass. 301, 304,103 N.E.2d 267, 269 (1952). 
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narily this finding of fact by the board is not open to review by a court 
unless the board's decision is lacking in evidential support. 
§19.4. Postponement of hearing due to engagement of counsel. 
One of the most interesting workmen's compensation cases of first im-
pression to come before the Supreme Judicial Court during the 1960 
SURVEY year is Ackroyd's Case.1 This involved an appeal from the 
denial in the Superior Court of the insurer's motion to recommit a 
workmen's compensation proceeding to the Industrial Accident Board 
for an extension of the record or a new trial. The report of the 
single member showed that he heard the case in the absence of the 
insurer's designated counsel. The single member's decision in which 
he awarded compensation stated that the attorney for the insurer did 
not appear, and counsel for the claimant would not agree to a post-
ponement of the case. The insurer did have an attorney present who 
represented the company at two conferences earlier in the morning 
and who sat through the proceedings, but declined to file an appear-
ance and stated to the single member that he had no authority to 
represent the insurer in the Ackroyd matter. 
Before the reviewing board, the insurer filed a motion to recommit 
the case to the single member to permit the insurer to present its evi-
dence and for an extension of the record to show that the insurer's 
designated counsel was engaged in Superior Court on the morning the 
case was heard before the single member. The reviewing board denied 
the insurer's motion, principally for the reason that it was not neces-
sary that a specific attorney act as trial counsel on the date in question. 
The decision of the reviewing board further indicated that the in-
surer was extensively engaged in workmen's compensation insurance 
in the Commonwealth and had available a number of compensation 
trial attorneys. Before the Superior Court, in support of its motion 
to recommit the case to the board, the insurer filed affidavits of five 
attorneys, employed by the insurer. Two made oath that on the day 
in question they were actually engaged in trial. One was under medi-
cal care and forbidden by his doctor to engage in a triali of cases. A 
Mr. Herman stated that although he was an attorney, he was employed 
by the insurer as a claims adjuster and that he had "not engaged in 
the practice of law," and had "no trial experience." Herman was in-
structed by Attorney Dymsza to request a continuance fr~m the single 
member or have the case stand until he completed his eqgagement in 
Salem. When these requests were denied by the single ~ember, Her-
man telephoned Dymsza at the Salem courthouse and was told by the 
latter that "he would hurry to Lawrence as soon as his engagement 
was completed." This information was relayed to the commissioner. 
Trial proceeded in the Ackroyd case in the absence' of Attorney Dym-
sza, and the case was concluded and all left the hearing room before 
12:45 P.M. The Superior Court denied the insurer's motion to re-
commit. 
§19.4. 1340 Mass. 214,163 N.E.2d 271 (1960). 
6
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1960 [1960], Art. 22
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1960/iss1/22
214 1960 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW §19.4 
Mr. Justice Cutter carefully pointed out in the decision that "[t]he 
single member, in refusing a continuance, may have. relied upon cir-
cumstances which do not appear in the board's decision." 2 The rec-
ord contained evidence that the employee was a very sick man and 
undoubtedly the single member and the claimant's counsel were con-
cerned about this circumstance. The Court went on to state: "Noth-
ing in the record shows that this insurer was habitually short of avail-
able trial counsel or that it had been warned, even once, to increase 
its staff of available trial lawyers. . .. There is no showing that the 
insurer had sought any prior continuance in this case." S 
The Court found that the reviewing board and single member made 
inadequate findings concerning the refusal of a continuance. It should 
be noted that the Industrial Accident Board has no written rules rela-
tive to engagement of counsel. The essence of Mr. Justice Cutter's 
statement was that without adequate findings the Court could not de-
termine with reasonable certainty whether there had been an abuse 
of discretion. Although not specifically mentioned in the single mem-
ber's decision, the congestion of the list at the Industrial Accident 
Board was probably one of the primary reasons for proceeding to trial 
on the case. It is unfortunate that an injured employee must wait for 
nearly one year for an adjudication as to the merits of his claim. It 
is equally a denial of justice to compel the insurer to wait that length 
of time for a formal hearing to terminate compensation payments. 
Many steps have been taken by the present board to alleviate this con-
dition. In addition, there have been several bills filed in the General 
Court that, if enacted, will expedite the hearing of cases. 
The granting of a continuance because of an engagement of counsel 
is a matter within the sound discretion of a court or an administrative 
board, subject to any applicable statutory provisions and court or ad-
ministrative rules.4 The trial judge or administrator will be reversed 
only for error of law or abuse of discretion,!1 In the Festo case,6 refer-
ence was made to the repeal by Acts of 1912, c. 542, of G.L., c. 173, §81, 
which formerly gave greater protection than now exists to counsel 
actually engaged in court; it was pointed out that leaving the matter 
of continuances to the sound discretion of the court was "the only way 
in which the trial of cases can proceed in an orderly and expeditious 
way." The Court in Festo found it was not an abuse of discretion to 
refuse a continuance because the defendant's counsel was engaged in 
another case in the Superior Court. But a careful reading of that 
case indicates that the defendant was represented throughout the 
2114O Mass. at 220, 1611 N.E. at 275. 
SIbid. 
4 See. e.g .• Superior Court Rule 57A. 
1\ Mowat v. DeLuca, llSO Mass. 711, 712, 116 N.E.2d 1122. 11211 (1953); Common-
wealth v. Festo. 251 Mass. 275. 277-278, 146 N.E. 700, 701 (1925); Noble v. Mead-
Morrison Manufacturing Co., 237 Mass. 5. 16, 129 N.E. 669, 670 (1921); Davis v. 
Boston Elevated Ry .• 235 Mass. 482. 496-497,126 N.E. 841, 843-844 (1920). 
6251 Mass. 275,146 N.E. 700 (1925). 
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trial by his original counsel, and consequently the decision in Festo 
should not be held controlling of the Ackroyd case, in which the facts 
are entirely dissimilar. The hard and fast rule indicated by the de-
cision in the Festo case should probably not be extended beyond its 
true intent when viewed in the light of the facts revealed by the record 
of that case. 
In general, when there is no evidence of bad faith, lack of diligence, 
unscrupulous tactics, prior postponements, negligence, failure to notify 
the trial court or other counsel seasonably of the situation, or some 
other fault, the appellate tribunal will generally reverse the lower 
court's action under its discretionary power.7 The usual basis for 
a reversal of the lower court is on the ground that there has been an 
abuse of discretion. However, the word "abuse" connotates some de-
liberate dereliction. The pertinent decisions indicate that a better 
word would be "error" in the use of discretion. The word "abuse" 
connotes malice, whereas lower tribunals in these situations have been 
reversed without any evidence of malice being shown. 
Refusal of the opportunity to have a case tried by counsel with 
knowledge of the case has been regarded in some circumstances as a 
denial of due process in a criminal prosecution.s Since time im-
memorial the right of a party to have his day in court has been jeal-
ously guarded. In a Texas case, it was stated that 
such hardships [continuances] are frequently necessary incidents 
to the best system of judicial procedure and do not furnish the 
sole test in determining the merits, either of a motion to continue, 
or a motion for a new trial. . . . The right of a party to a reason-
able opportunity to appear in court upon the trial of a case and 
present his side of the controversy is fundamental. Of course, if 
he is given that opportunity and through negligence or willful 
omission fails to take advantage of it, he cannot be heard to com-
plain. But, if such failure occurs by reason of circumstances 
which repel any presumption of negligence and which constitute 
an equitable excuse for such failure, then he has not forfeited his 
right to his day in court.9 
Necessity has given rise to the rule that a party to an action is not 
entitled, as a matter of absolute right, to a continuance of the cause 
on account of the absence of his counsel. If the rule were otherwise, 
a party seeking delay could, by using the absence of his counsel, com-
pletely thwart the business of the courts. All jurisdictions grant to 
7 Knapp v. Graham, 320 Mass. 50, 67 N.E. 2d 841 (1946); Tierney v. Coolidge, 308 
Mass. 255, 32 N.E.2d 198 (1941); Thompson v. Thornton, 41 Cal. 626 (1871); 
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Taylor, 52 Cal. App. 307, 198 Pac. 651 (1921); Johnson 
v. State, I Ga. App. 729, 57 S.E. 1056 (1907); Cox v. Spears, 181 Ky. 363, 206 S.W. 20 
(1918); Sussman v. Silverman, 199 N.Y. Supp. 419 (Sup. Ct. 1923); Modern Woodmen 
of America v. Floyd, 213 S.W. 1085 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920). 
8 Lindsey v. Commonwealth, 331 Mass. 1,4,116 N.E.2d 691, 692 (1954). 
9 Hovey v. Halsell-Arlege Cattle Co., 176 S.W. 897, 899·900 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915). 
8
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the trial court the discretion to grant or to deny a continuance that 
is requested because of the absence of the applicant's counsel. This 
discretionary power will not be reversed unless it is clearly shown 
that the power has been wrongly exercised to the palpable injury of the 
complaining party. Massachusetts subscribes to this general rule.10 
In a fairly recent criminal case, the defendant requested a continuance 
that was refused; in reversing the action of the lower court the Supreme 
Judicial Court said, "A reasonable opportunity to obtain counsel, if 
possible, and to prepare a defence is of the very substance of due 
process of law." 11 Here again, the appellate tribunal felt that justice 
required the reversal of the exercise of the lower court's discretion. An 
analogous situation was presented in another criminal case in which 
the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the lower court on the matter of 
continuance.12 Other jurisdictions have consistently reversed lower 
courts' refusals to grant continuances because of the engagement of 
counsel.13 
§19.5. Benefits. During the past several years, including the 1960 
SURVEY year, the benefit structure of the Workmen's Compensation 
Act has been extensively revised. Less than twenty-five years ago the 
weekly compensation to an injured employee was as little as $9 per 
week, whereas today it is as much as $45. At one time $1500 compen-
sated an employee who lost his vision; today it is $10,000. No pay-
ments were made to dependents before 1945; now each dependent of 
an injured employee is entitled to $6 per week. 
The more important monetary benefits provided by C.L., c. 152, are 
as follows: 
Total disability.l While the employee is totally incapacitated for 
work, he is entitled to two-thirds of his average weekly wage, not to 
exceed $45 per week. 
Partial disability.2 While the incapacity for work is partial, the em-
ployee is entitled to the entire difference between his average weekly 
wage before the injury and the average wage he is able to earn there-
after, but not more than $45 per week. 
Dependency payments.3 When the employee has persons conclu-
sively presumed to be dependent upon him, $6 per week is added to the 
weekly compensation payable to the employee totally, partially, or per-
manently disabled. 
10 Commonwealth v. Festo, 251 Mass. 275,146 N.E. 700 (1925). 
11 Jones v. Commonwealth, 331 Mass. 169, 171, 117 N.E.2d 820, 822 (1954). 
12 Lindsey v. Commonwealth, 331 Mass. I, 116 N .E.2d 691 (1954). 
13 See, e.g., Richardson v. Boyd, 69 Ark. 368,63 S.W. 798 (1901); Bartel v. Tierman, 
55 Ind. 438 (1876); Rice v. Melendy, 36 Iowa 166 (1872); Myers v. Trice, 86 Va. 
835, 11 S.E. 428 (1890). 
§19.5. 1 C.L., c. 152, §34; the amount was last increased by Acts of 1959, c. 566. 
Citations to sections in the following notes refer to sections of C.L., c. 152, and 
citations to amendments refer to the last act in point of time that increased 
monetary benefits. 
2 §35, as amended by Acts of 1959, c. 566. 
3 §35A, as amended by Acts of 1959, c. 566. 
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Permanent and total disability.4 When the employee is permanently 
and totally disabled, he is entitled to two-thirds of his average weekly 
wage, but not more than $45 per week during the period of incapacity. 
Death benefits to unmarried widow or widower.!' The unmarried 
widow or widower is entitled to $30 per week as long as she or he re-
mains unmarried. The total amount of payments under this section, 
however, may not be more than $14,000. In addition, each child of 
the deceased employee under the age of eighteen is entitled to $5 per 
week. 
Specific compensation.6 In cases of the following specified injuries, 
in addition to all other compensation, compensation at the rate of $20 
per week is payable for a prescribed number of weeks, the total dollar 
amount of which is indicated below: 
(a) for the total loss of use of both eyes, $10,0007 
(b) for the total loss of use of one eye, $40008 
(c) for the permanent reduction in vision in either eye below nor-
mal but not to 20/70ths, a proportional payment is now al-
lowed9 
(d) for the loss of hearing in both ears, $600010 
(e) for the loss of hearing in one ear, $200011 
(f) bodily disfigurement, up to $2500 at the discretion of the In-
dustrial Accident Board12 
(g) loss of bodily fmiction or senses, up to $2000 at the Board's dis-
cretion13 
(h) loss of right or major arm at the shoulder, $350014 
(i) loss of left or minor arm at the shoulder, $300015 
(j) loss of both arms at the shoulder, $800016 
(k) loss of right or major hand at the wrist, $250017 
(1) loss of left or minor hand at the wrist, $200018 
(m) loss of both hands at the wrist, $600019 
(n) loss by severance of either leg at hip, $350020 
4 §34A, as amended by Acts of 1959, c. 566. 
5 §32, as amended by Acts of 1959, c. 530. 
6 §36. Unless otherwise indicated in notes 7·24 infra, the last amendment af-
fecting compensation was made by Acts of 1953, c. 64. 
7 §36(a). 
8 §36(d), as amended by Acts of 1959, c. 230, to modify definition of loss of vision 
in one eye. 
9 §36(e). 






16 §36(t), added by Acts of 1959, c. 545, §3. 
17 §36(1). 
18 §36(m). 
19 §36(s), added by Acts of 1959, c. 545, §3. 
20 §36(n). 
10
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(0) loss by severance of both legs at the hip, $800021 
(p) loss of either foot above the ankle, $250022 
(q) loss by severance of both feet, $650023 
§19.4 
(r) if the member is not lost by severance, but is so injured as to 
be permanently incapable of use, the same amount as though 
it were severed24 
In case of death, reasonable burial expenses, not exceeding $1000,25 
are awarded. 
21 §36(n), this new coverage being added by Acts of 1959, c. 545. 
22 §36(O). 
23 §36(o), this new coverage being added by Acts of 1959, c. 545. 
24 §36(q). 
25 §33, as amended by Acts of 1960, c. 246, increasing the basic amount from $500. 
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